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PURPOSE OF THESIS 
This paper is a discussion of John F. Kennedy and his policies concerning 
Vietnam. The main focus is to examine the theory that John F. Kennedy would 
have removed American forces from Vietnam after his reelection. A history of 
United States involvement in Vietnam is presented to allow the appropriate setting 
for Kennedy's term in office. Kennedy's policies and decisions concerning Vietnam 
while he was in office are outlined in full detail to determine what his policy might 
have been had he served a second term in office. The theory that Kennedy would 
have withdrawn American troops from Vietnam is argued from both sides by using 
selected facts and quotations from those who were close to President Kennedy. The 
events in Vietnam following the assassination of President Kennedy are examined 
to determine their possible impact on Kennedy's future decisions toward Vietnam. 
Finally, a conclusion is offered based on the facts presented. 
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The presidency of John Fitzgerald Kennedy is perhaps the most intriguing of 
any United States President. When Kennedy came to office, he offered America a 
chance at his "New Frontier." This New Frontier was a call to all Americans for a 
peaceful revolution for human rights and an end to racial discrimination. Kennedy 
was the President that passed the torch of leadership in the United States to a new 
generation. He represented the hope that a new era of liberty would reach across 
the globe. When President Kennedy was assassinated, that hope was gone. All that 
remained was the question of what might have been had Kennedy lived to serve a 
second term as President. 
The many mysteries surrounding the life, and specifically the presidency, of 
John F. Kennedy have captivated the American public. His alleged involvement 
with Hollywood movie star Marilyn Monroe and the still mysterious circumstances 
surrounding his assassiD.ation have made John F. Kennedy into a popular cultural 
figure. Many of the questions that the American public would like to have 
answered about Kennedy's presidency and what might have been had he not been 
assassinated will never be fully answered. In the film JFK directed by Oliver Stone, 
the director explores the theory that Kennedy's assassination was connected to his 
plan to withdraw American troops from South Vietnam. Stone has a way of 
blending fact with fiction that leaves the viewer believing that President Kennedy's 
plan to withdraw from Vietnam was a foregone conclusion. 
This paper attempts to deal with the question of President Kennedy's plan to 
withdraw American forces from Vietnam. After researching the topic, I believe 
John F. Kennedy would not have ended United States involvement in Vietnam 
after his reelection. 
Before proceeding any further it is important to understand a brief history of 
Vietnam and the record of American involvement in that region. The government 
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in South Vietnam was led by President Ngo Dinh Diem from 1954 to 1963. He was 
fighting for an independent and anti-Communist Vietnam. The Communist force 
against Diem was a guerrilla movement called the Viet Cong.1 The beginning of 
serious involvement by the United States in Vietnam can be traced to the 
Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower started his foreign policy by 
continuing with the Truman policy of working with other western allies to contain 
Communism. This included helping the French in their effort to fight the 
Communists in South Vietnam. In 1954 the French surrendered their effort and 
prepared to withdraw from the region.2 A conference was set up in Geneva to 
determine the future of Vietnam. The 1954 Geneva Accords split Vietnam at the 
seventeenth parallel, creating a Communist North Vietnam and a non-Communist 
South Vietnam.3 As the French were leaving the region, the United States assumed 
the task of aiding the South Vietnamese in their fight against Communism. 
Eisenhower made a pledge to help South Vietnam against Communist aggression. 
The President wrote Diem in 1954 and said that America would "assist the 
government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, 
capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."4 
To help combat Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) was formed. The countries in the organization included the 
United States, France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines.5 SEATO provided the means for which joint action could be taken in 
the event of Communist aggression. Eisenhower used the SEATO agreement to 
justify American involvement in Southeast Asia. 
Eisenhower never wavered in his conviction that South Vietnam was of 
grave importance to American foreign policy. In his State of the Union Address in 
1953, Eisenhower said France was "holding the line of freedom in Indochina against 
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-the calculated assault of Communist aggression throughout the world."6 It was 
Eisenhower who applied the "domino theory" to Southeast Asia. The domino 
theory was the belief that if one country falls to Communism, surrounding 
countries will become Communist in quick succession? Eisenhower said, "You 
have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen 
to the last one is that it will go over very quickly. So you have a beginning of a 
disintegration that would have the most profound influences."s 
To stop the spread of Communism, Eisenhower developed the "New Look" 
defense strategy. This strategy sought economic ways to contain Communism, 
namely covert operations and the threat of nuclear force.9 The President was 
frightened at the thought of using American ground forces in Vietnam. Io Instead, 
he stressed the need for massive retaliation against Communist aggression led by 
United States air power. On January 5, 1954 Eisenhower told bipartisan 
congressional leaders that the United States would "hit them [the Viet Cong] with 
everything we've got. We have the weapons and the planes to do it."ll Eisenhower 
ultimately wanted to buy time for the South Vietnamese government to gain 
strength and offer a viable alternative to the Communists. The United States 
supported President Diem as the best hope for Vietnamese resistance against the 
Communists. During his term, Eisenhower sent eight hundred military advisors to 
South Vietnam to aid Diem. By the end of his administration, Eisenhower had 
bound the American government with the government of Diem in South 
Vietnam.12 
While Eisenhower was developing American foreign policy as President, 
Kennedy was serving his country as a member of the United States Congress. 
Kennedy represented the Eleventh Congressional District from Massachusetts in 
the House of Representatives from 1947 to 1952. He was elected Senator from 
3 
_ Massachusetts in 1952 and served in that position until being elected President in 
1960.13 During his time in Congress, Kennedy spoke out in favor of independence 
for Indochina and he publicly backed the domino theory. When President Kennedy 
took office, he made three major decisions concerning Vietnam: to increase the 
Eisenhower commitment, to make the survival of the Diem government a major 
objective in foreign policy, and to hold the line against Communist guerrilla 
activity. 14 
To gain insight into what John Kennedy's policy on Vietnam might have 
been had he served a second term in office, it is logical to look at his record 
concerning the situation in Vietnam while he was in office. In his Inaugural 
Address, Kennedy stressed the policy of containing Communism. He said, 
The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands 
the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of 
human life ... Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, 
that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, 
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the 
success of liberty ... To those people in the huts and villages of half the 
globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best 
efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required, 
not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their 
votes, but because it is right.ls 
Shortly ,after taking office, Kennedy ordered five hundred special forces and other 
military advisors to South Vietnam .. This marked the first time the United States 
had more advisors in South Vietnam than were allowed under the Geneva 
Accords.16 By the end of 1961, Kennedy had increased the number of United States 
advisors in Vietnam from eight hundred to sixteen thousandP By the end of 1962, 
United States aircraft had been used to carry South Vietnamese troops into battle, 
and United States pilots had flown hundreds of missions and had fired on Viet 
Cong troopS.lS Kennedy strongly believed in the importance of American 
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- involvement in Southeast Asia, but he did not want to fight a war in that region. 
He did not want the situation in Vietnam to escalate into a full scale war that 
involved American troops in combat. In 1963 he said, "1'11 never send draftees over 
there to fight. "19 
Had Kennedy lived to serve a second term, this statement might have very 
well been true. But, the question here is whether he would have ended American 
involvement altogether. John Kennedy did sign an order to reduce American 
military personnel in Vietnam by one thousand men before he died. This order 
was issued during a period of optimism in September of 1963. The order to bring 
one thousand troops home from Vietnam had not yet been executed when 
Kennedy was assassinated. It is the only order Kennedy ever issued that planned to 
remove troops from Vietnam. 
Kennedy did not live long enough to execute the troop reduction order, nor 
did he live long enough to see the results of a major event in Vietnam. This event 
was the assassination of President Diem. By the Fall of 1963, the United States was 
beginning to separate itself from Diem. The separation had started with a political 
crisis involving the Buddhists in South Vietnam. In May 1963 a group of Buddhists 
met to celebrate the birthday of Buddha. South Vietnamese troops asked the 
Buddhists to disperse, and when they did not, the government troops opened fire 
and killed nine Buddhists.20 The Buddhists began a series of protests which became 
a spearhead for all the dissident groups in South Vietnam. Under pressure from 
the United States, Diem negotiated a partial settlement with the Buddhists in July 
1963. It soon became clear, however, that Diem would not follow through with the 
concessions he had promised.21 Kennedy felt uneasy about the possibility of not 
backing Diem, but many of his advisors felt the effort in Vietnam could not be won 
with Diem in control. At the end of August and through September, there was a 
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series of cables between South Vietnam and Washington discussing the possibility 
of a coup against Diem and his government.22 Although Kennedy never officially 
authorized the coup of Diem's government, he let that eventual outcome happen 
by not acting to stop it.23 Kennedy had cut aid to South Vietnam which sent a 
message to dissenters that the United States was growing intolerant of the Diem 
government. Kennedy also gave wide latitude to Henry Cabot Lodge, the American 
Ambassador to Vietnam, who had a well known animosity toward Diem.24 By 
giving Lodge room to act, Kennedy in effect let the coup take place. The CIA 
reported on November 1, 1963 that a coup was likely to occur that day.25 The coup 
did take place, and President Diem was assassinated in the process. Upon hearing of 
the assassination, Kennedy was shocked. Maxwell Taylor, who was with Kennedy 
when he received the information, said, "Kennedy leaped to his feet and rushed 
from the room with such a look of shock and dismay on his face which I had never 
seen before."26 The assassination of Diem only created a more unstable situation in 
South Vietnam. The government there demonstrated frequent political changes 
and a revolving door of military and civilian leaders. The declining situation in 
Vietnam erased the optimism that was present before Kennedy'S death and surly 
would have affected his decision making concerning Vietnam. 
Although it may seem that the situation in Vietnam was the main focus in 
American foreign policy during Kennedy'S term in office, in reality, Vietnam was 
overshadowed by several other events. The first of these events was the crisis in 
Berlin in 1961. Khrushchev, the Russian Premier, wanted the Allies (the United 
States, France, and Great Britain) out of West Berlin. This would enable all of 
Berlin to be under Communist rule. Kennedy did not want to pull out of West 
Berlin because he was afraid that West Germany would tum against the United 
States and leave NATO,27 Since the situation pitted the United States against 
6 
-Russia, the threat of nuclear war became very strong in the minds of the American 
people. Khrushchev actually wanted to take over West Berlin because many East 
Germans were crossing over into West Berlin, which was becoming a thriving 
industrial city.28 Because Kennedy made a firm stand against Khrushchev, the 
Russian Premier gave up on the idea of a Communist West Berlin. Instead he 
decided to solve the problem by having the East Germans build the Berlin Wall. 
The wall was built on East German territory, and it effectively stemmed the tide of 
East German refugees. 
The next major events in foreign policy concerned the country of Cuba. 
When Kennedy came into the White House, the plan to overthrow Castro with 
Cuban refugees was already set to take place at the Bay of Pigs. The United States 
CIA organized, trained, and transported fourteen thousand Cuban exiles for the 
invasion.29 The revolt was crushed within three days and ended with the capture of 
the anti-Castro Cubans. Kennedy publicly took the blame for the failed invasion. 
The other event in Cuba was the Cuban missile crisis. An Air Force U-2 
reconnaissance plane had discovered that the Soviets had been building missile 
bases in Cuba. President Kennedy made it very clear that the United States would 
risk the brink of war in order to remove the missiles from Cuba. The Cuban missile 
crisis lasted for two weeks until Khrushchev finally removed the missiles . 
. Although these events and the cold war crises overshadowed what was 
happening in Southeast Asia, they did have an impact on the situation there. 
Kennedy's firm stand against Khrushchev weakened the image of the Soviet leader 
with the Chinese. This caused a break in the alliance between the Soviets and the 
Chinese. Kennedy felt a settlement could have been reached with the Viet Cong if 
Khrushchev had been more powerful in Asia.30 With the weakened alliance 
between Russia and China, the threat of a Chinese move against South Vietnam 
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increased. This impending threat provoked the first buildup of American advisory 
troops in Vietnam.31 
Even in Southeast Asia, the main focus when Kennedy came to office was on 
the situation in Laos. The Communists wanted to overtake the neutral country of 
Laos, but Kennedy warned Khrushchev that he backed Laotian neutrality. The 
President moved aircraft carriers into the South China Sea and landed Marines in 
Thailand to show his determination for Laotian neutrality. Khrushchev agreed to 
make a political settlement on Laos because he did not want to get involved in a 
conventional land war in Asia.32 Again, if Khrushchev had more influence in 
Asia, a settlement may have been reached in that region as well. The situation in 
Laos showed Kennedy's strong desire to stop the spread of Communism and his 
willingness to use military action to insure this course of action would never take 
place. 
Although Kennedy was against the spread of Communism, he first had 
doubts about United States involvement in Vietnam in 1961 when he met with 
General Douglas MacArthur. In the fourth month of his presidency, Kennedy 
sought MacArthur's advice on the situation in Vietnam. MacArthur warned 
Kennedy against the commitment of American soldiers to the Asian mainland.33 
He said the Asian mainland was no place to be fighting a non-nuclear land war. 
MacArthur's argument made quite an impression on the President. According to 
General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Kennedy, 
President Kennedy would often tell the Joint Chiefs of Staff to convince MacArthur 
that the United States presence in Vietnam was necessary.34 Kennedy said if 
MacArthur was convinced, then he would be convinced. MacArthur's advice to 
Kennedy may have been influenced by his resentment toward former President 
Eisenhower and his commitment to Vietnam. When MacArthur was relieved 
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-from duty by President Truman for exceeding his authority in Korea, MacArthur 
spoke out against Truman and his policies. MacArthur openly campaigned against 
Truman's reelection and Eisenhower's campaign for the Republican nomination.35 
MacArthur may have told Kennedy to stay out of Vietnam because it was 
Eisenhower who started the United States commitment there. Whatever his 
motives may have been, MacArthur's advice had a lasting impression on President 
Kennedy. "The last thing he [Kennedy] wanted," General Taylor later said, "was to 
put in our ground forces."J6 
Kennedy received similar advice from Charles De Gaulle. De Gaulle was the 
President of France, which had fought in Vietnam in the early 1950's. The French 
war effort in Vietnam collapsed in the spring of 1954.37 De Gaulle explained to 
Kennedy that the French had shown the hopelessness of fighting in Vietnam. "For 
you," De Gaulle said, "intervention in this region will be an entanglement without 
end."38 De Gaulle's words foreshadowed the eventual American involvement in 
Vietnam. 
The theory that John Kennedy would have removed American forces from 
Vietnam had he been elected to a second term in office gained national attention in 
1970 when Kenneth O'Donnell made such a claim in a Life magazine article. 
Kenneth O'Donnell was Kennedy'S Appointments Secretary. O'Donnell was a 
Massachusetts Irishman who worked with Kennedy since his 1946 Congressional 
campaign.39 O'Donnell had a close relationship to the President while staying 
virtually anonymous to the press during Kennedy's term in office. O'Donnell was 
perhaps closer to John Kennedy than anyone, except the president's brother, Robert 
Kennedy.40 O'Donnell's statement in the Life magazine article was excerpted from 
his then forthcoming book about Kennedy's life. O'Donnell said that Kennedy told 
him before his ill-fated trip to Texas that he wanted to win the 1964 election by a 
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-landslide because he was going to make the unpopular decision of withdrawing all 
American troops from Vietnam soon after his reelection.41 Kennedy had decided, 
said O'Donnell, that America's involvement would only grow more steady and 
costly without making a dent in the larger political problem of Communist 
expansion in Southeast Asia. O'Donnell has always maintained that, although 
Kennedy never made any public statements that he was considering American 
withdrawal, the President would have brought American troops home before the 
end of 1965. Along with O'Donnell, other close aides to Kennedy have stated that 
he spoke privately of pulling out of Vietnam. 
Senator Mike Mansfield, who was the Senate majority leader in 1963, 
confirmed O'Donnell's account that the President had wanted to withdraw United 
States forces from Vietnam. "He had definitely and unequivocally made that 
decision, " Mansfield was quoted as saying in the Washington Post in 1970.42 
Senator Mansfield had long been a proponent of United States withdrawal from 
Vietnam. He returned from a trip to Southeast Asia in late 1962 and told Kennedy 
that he should consider withdrawal. Kennedy later said, "I got angry with Mike for 
disagreeing with our policy so completely, and I got angry with myself because I 
found myself agreeing with him."43 Mansfield said that in the spring of 1963 
Kennedy told him that he had serious second thoughts concerning Mansfield's 
argument and that Kennedy now agreed with the Senator's thinking on the need 
for withdrawal. Mansfield quoted Kennedy as saying, "But we can't do it until after 
1965, after I'm reelected ... In 1965 I'll be damned everywhere as a Communist 
appeaser."44 Mansfield says Kennedy feared a conservative outcry against his 
reelection if he announced his plans for withdrawal before the election. " ... But I 
can do it after we are reelected, // said Kennedy, "So we had better make damned 
sure that I am reelected.//45 Mansfield's statements give further evidence that 
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Kennedy spoke privately about the possibility of withdrawing American forces from 
Vietnam. 
Along with O'Donnell and Mansfield, Robert McNamara believes that 
Kennedy was going to pull out of Vietnam. McNamara was Kennedy's Secretary of 
Defense, and he continued in this capacity under President Johnson. McNamara 
says the plan to withdraw was true. He says he had "an understanding with 
Kennedy that they would close out Vietnam by sixty-five, whether it was in good 
shape or bad."46 This statement does not seem valid, however, when compared to 
McNamara's later policies concerning American involvement in Vietnam. In early 
1965 McNamara stressed how vital the United States' stakes were in Vietnam. He 
said he believed the United States should be committed to keeping South Vietnam 
from Communism. "No region is more vulnerable and exposed to Communist 
subversion than Southeast Asia," said McNamara.47 McNamara also said referring 
to United States involvement in Vietnam in the late 1960's: liMy belief was that we 
were having difficulty militarily, but we still had a chance of progressing on the 
political track as a result of our military pressure. If I didn't believe that, I should 
have strongly recommended withdrawing from Vietnam. "48 Also, McNamara has 
no record of dissenting when President Johnson sent troops into North Vietnam. 
The Pentagon Papers states McNamara's position as wanting to hold the line on 
United States personnel in Vietnam. It gave no mention of the withdrawal of 
troopS.49 McNamara's statements on America's withdrawal from Vietnam seem 
confusing and are contradictory at best. Perhaps they can best be explained by 
Deborah Shapley, McNamara's biographer, when she stated, 
I found myself suspecting, in interviews with McNamara and when 
reviewing the above quotes for publication, that his sincere belief that 
Kennedy would have gotten out of Vietnam was something he arrived 
at later, when the war had become tragic and traumatic for him and the 
nation ... and the temptation to self deceive, to believe that his hero 
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and mentor would have wisely guided them out, must still be very 
strong.so 
Thus, Shapley suggests that McNamara's opinion that Kennedy would have pulled 
out of Vietnam may be based on hopeful optimism rather than genuine conviction. 
Along with those who say Kennedy had a plan to completely withdraw from 
Vietnam, there are others close to Kennedy who claim that no consideration was 
given to pulling out of Vietnam. The most outspoken proponent of the notion that 
Kennedy would not have withdr~wn American troops from Vietnam has been 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State under Kennedy. Rusk served under Kennedy and 
also served as Secretary of State under President Johnson. Rusk strongly supported 
American involvement in Vietnam. He said, "We never seriously considered the 
option of outright withdrawal and allowing South Vietnam to be overrun by the 
Communists."sl When Rusk heard of O'Donnell's claims that Kennedy was going 
to pull out of Vietnam, he offered his own opinion on the subject. Referring to the 
withdrawal he said, "Despite his frustration over Vietnam, I do not believe John 
Kennedy came to any such decision."s2 
On a different occasion, again referring to the withdrawal, Rusk stated, "I had 
hundreds of talks with John F. Kennedy about Vietnam, and never once did he say 
anything of this sort to his own Secretary of State."S3 Rusk felt Kennedy would not 
have waited until after the election to start a withdrawal. He said if Kennedy had 
waited until after the election, "He would have left Americans in a combat zone for 
domestic political purposes, and no President can do that."54 Rusk offered an 
explanation for O'Donnell's theory about the supposed withdrawal. He said, 
Kennedy liked to bat the breeze and toss ideas around, and it is entirely 
possible that he left the impression with some that he planned on 
getting out of Vietnam in 1965. But that does not mean that he made a 
decision in 1963 to withdraw in 1965. Had he done so, I think I would 
have known about it ... President Kennedy's attitude on Vietnam 
should be derived from what he said and did while president, not what 
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he may have said at tea table conversations or walks around the Rose 
Garden.55 
It is clear that Rusk felt Kennedy was committed to American involvement and any 
suggestion that he was going to withdraw from Vietnam was merely speculation. 
Another key figure in the Kennedy White House at this time was General 
Maxwell Taylor. General Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
1962. Taylor was in favor of American involvement in Vietnam and never 
suggested withdrawal. He said, lilt never occurred to me to recommend 
withdrawal. There were too many reasons for not thinking about retreat. In the 
first place, we had not exhausted our alternatives or made inroads into our vast 
resources./156 Taylor had criticized the New Look strategy of Eisenhower because he 
felt the threat of nuclear war was impractical. Instead, Taylor suggested the United 
States be ready for a "Flexible Response" in the face of Communist aggression. The 
Doctrine of Flexible Response called for waging limited wars in situations that were 
of national interestP Taylor felt the United States Army should be combat-ready in 
order to wage a quick and successful strike if needed. It is clear Taylor believed the 
American forces could be successful in stopping Communist aggression. In late 
September and early October of 1963, Taylor went on a fact finding mission with 
Secretary of State McNamara to Vietnam. The report these two men submitted to 
the President on their return stated that the situation in Vietnam was serious, but 
showed signs of optimism.58 It was the optimism in this report that prompted 
Kennedy to announce the plan to withdraw one thousand troops from Vietnam. 
He made this announcement because he thought the war was going well, and he 
thought the amount of advisors could be reduced.59 
Besides stating his opinion on American involvement in Vietnam, General 
Taylor also offers insight into the importance of Robert Kennedy, President 
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Kennedy's younger brother, in the decision making process of the White House. In 
his autobiography, Taylor says, /I As I meditated on ways and means to serve 
President Kennedy, I often sought the advice of Bob Kennedy as to what was feasible 
and what was incompatible with the President's natural way of doing business."6o 
This statement suggests that Robert Kennedy was very knowledgeable of his 
brother's policies, and he most likely knew his brother's thoughts on many 
important subjects. 
For this reason, the most important figure in proving that Kennedy was not 
going to remove American forces from Vietnam is perhaps Robert Kennedy. 
Robert served as Attorney General under his brother John. Kenneth O'Donnell said 
that Robert was closer to John than anyone. If President Kennedy had a plan to pull 
out of Vietnam by the end of 1965, it is likely that Robert Kennedy would have 
known about it. Had Robert Kennedy known about a plan to withdraw from 
Vietnam, it is likely that he would have made that information public after his 
brother's death, but Robert Kennedy never made any mention of a secret plan to 
withdraw American forces from Vietnam. 
Robert Kennedy always maintained strong support for American 
involvement in Vietnam during his brother's presidency and in the years following 
his death. In February of 1962, Robert spent a few hours in Saigon. While he was 
there, he said, "We are going to win the war in Vietnam. We will remain here until 
we do win./61 Later he said, "I think the American people understand and fully 
support this struggle. I think the United States will do what is necessary to help a 
country that is trying to repel aggression with its own blood, tears and sweat."62 
After John Kennedy'S assassination, Robert stressed the need for peace talks 
and was against further escalation in Vietnam, however, he was still against a total 
withdrawal. Even in 1965, the year the alleged withdrawal was supposed to be 
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completed, Robert said, "withdrawal would mean a repudiation of commitments 
undertaken and confirmed by three administrations and would gravely - perhaps 
irreparably - weaken the democratic position in Asia."63 In 1964 Robert Kennedy 
explained the situation in Vietnam in his book Pursuit of Iustice by saying, "This 
kind of warfare can be long-drawn-out and costly, but if Communism is to be 
stopped, it is necessary."64 Arthur Schlesinger, who wrote biographies on both John 
and Robert Kennedy, summed up Robert's views on America's involvement in 
Southeast Asia by stating, 
Robert's own understanding of his brother's position, as he expounded 
it to John Bartlow Martin in the spring of 1964, was that John Kennedy 
felt 'we should win the war' because the loss of Vietnam would mean 
the fall of the rest of Southeast Asia; that there had been no 
consideration given to pulling out and at the same time no disposition 
to go further in.65 
Later in the interview, Martin asked Robert Kennedy, "If the South Vietnamese 
were about to lose, would John Kennedy have sent ground forces?" Robert 
responded by saying, "Well, we'd have faced that when we came to it. "66 The fact 
that Robert's response uses the word "we" when asked what his brother would 
have done is very significant. It shows that Robert Kennedy was very aware of 
President Kennedy's policy on Vietnam, and that Robert would have been involved 
in the decisions concerning Vietnam. The strong likelihood that Robert Kennedy 
knew of his brother's plans for Vietnam and the fact that he never mentioned a 
plan to withdraw from Vietnam offer strong evidence that no plan ever existed. 
The theory that Kennedy was going to pull out of Vietnam can only be based 
on speculation and hearsay. When the facts are examined, it is obvious that 
Kennedy felt the United States had a commitment in South Vietnam, and he did 
not want to back away from that commitment. The statements Kennedy made up 
to his death give justifications for American involvement in Vietnam, and they 
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_ offer no mention of withdrawal. Kennedy made it clear on two evening news 
shows in 1963 that he did not want American soldiers to go over and fight the war 
for the South Vietnamese, but he stressed the fact that the United States would help 
the South Vietnamese in whatever way it could. In an interview with Walter 
Cronkite of CBS on September 2 of that year, Kennedy said, 
It is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We 
can help them, we can send them equipment, we can send our men 
out there as advisors ... but in the final analysis it is their people and 
their government who have to win or lose this struggle ... All we can 
do is help, and we are making it very clear, but I don't agree with those 
who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake.67 
Just one week later on September 9, Kennedy was interviewed by David Brinkley 
for NBC. In that interview, Kennedy stated the reasons for United States 
involvement in Vietnam. He said, 
I believe the domino theory. I think the the struggle is close enough. 
China is so large, looms up high just beyond the frontiers, that if South 
Vietnam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic 
position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the 
impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China 
and the Communists.68 
Later in that same interview, Kennedy expressed his feelings for the American 
people's impatience with the situation in Vietnam. He said, 
What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient 
and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't 
like the government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only 
makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should 
use our influence in as effective way as we can, but we should not 
withdraw.69 
On another occasion in September of 1963, Kennedy outlined the American 
policy on Vietnam. He said the policy is "a very simple policy. We want the war to 
be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home. That is 
our policy. I am sure it is the policy of the people of Vietnam. We are not there to 
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__ see a war lost."70 On September 26, Kennedy again refuted the idea of withdrawal. 
He said, "So all those who suggest we withdraw, all those who suggest we should no 
longer ship our surplus food abroad or assist other countries, I could not disagree 
with them more."71 It is clear that Kennedy endorsed American involvement in 
Vietnam wholeheartedly in his public statements. To gain an understanding of 
what Kennedy's policy on Vietnam might have been in his second term in office, 
the actions of Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy's successor in the White House, should 
be examined. 
When Johnson assumed the presidency, he stated that he wanted to continue 
with the current policy on Vietnam established by Kennedy. The Pentagon Papers 
suggests that Johnson was planning to go ahead with the one thousand man 
withdrawal until estimates of the situation in Vietnam were seen as far less than 
optimistic. The planned reduction was executed, but it was merely an accounting 
exercise. Much of the reduction was part of the normal turnover cycle.72 Johnson 
continued with approximately the same level of advisors that Kennedy had 
established. 
In August 1964, however, Johnson's policy quickly changed. On August 2 and 
3, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked American destroyers in the Gulf of 
Tonkin.73 In response to these attacks, Johnson pushed for the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution, in which Congress gave Johnson the power to dispatch American 
troops to North Vietnam if he deemed it necessary.74 This paved the way for an 
escalation in the war and total involvement on the part of the United States. 
It is important to note that Johnson had the same advisors that Kennedy 
would have had in 1965, when Johnson ordered the retaliatory bombing of North 
Vietnam. Johnson received full support from his cabinet on the decision, including 
that of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Had Kennedy lived to serve his 
17 
-second term as President, he might have been challenged by an event similar to the 
Tonkin Gulf incident. It is unclear if Kennedy would have ordered retaliatory . 
strikes or started further escalation in the effort in Vietnam. It is unlikely, however, 
that he would have withdrawn American forces from Vietnam altogether. 
There will always be aspects of President Kennedy's life that the American 
public will never fully understand. His policy toward American involvement in 
Vietnam, however, has been fully documented. Kennedy was always against 
Communist expansion. Kennedy's objectives in Vietnam were very clear: to 
contain Communism, avoid escalation on the part of the United States military, 
and put the South Vietnamese in a position to achieve a settlement on its own.7S 
The President had shown his resolve against the Communists in the Cuban missile 
crisis, and it is likely he would have continued to defy the spread of Communism 
in Southeast Asia. President Kennedy did face an embarrassment in the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco and probably did not want to risk another embarrassment involving the 
military. Thus, it is possible that Kennedy would not have sent United States 
ground forces into North Vietnam. 
There are those, like O'Donnell and McNamara, who have looked back at the 
situation in Vietnam and have concluded that Kennedy would have pulled 
American forces from that region. Kennedy may have considered the thought of 
pulling out of Vietnam on a few occasions, and he may have mentioned that idea to 
others. However, when speculations are put aside and the facts are examined, it is 
clear Kennedy had not made a decision to pull out of Vietnam. Robert Kennedy, 
the closest person to the President, never mentioned a secret plan to withdraw 
troops from Vietnam. In fact, he spoke out in favor of continued United States 
involvement after President Kennedy's assassination. Also, President Kennedy 
repeatedly spoke out in favor of American involvement in his public statements. 
18 
_ Even up to the day John Kennedy was assassinated, he defended the United States' 
involvement in Vietnam. The speech he was going to deliver at the Dallas Trade 
Mart on November 22 said, "Our assistance to these nations can be painful, risky 
and costly, as is true in Southeast Asia today. But we dare not weary of the task."76 
The theory that John Kennedy was going to remove American troops from 
Vietnam can only be based on speculation. Even President Kennedy could not have 
known in 1963 what events were going to happen in regard to Vietnam and how he 
would have reacted to them. Many people would like to believe that the young 
President would have correctly guided the American forces in Vietnam to a 
successful conclusion. The tragedy lies in the fact that the American public will 
never know. 
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